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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
KHAITRAN, : Case No. 20030533-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of Theft, a Third-degree 
felony in violation of U.C.A.§ 76-6-404. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL BASED 
UPON A VIOLATION OF UCA §77-17-13? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was properly preserved for appeal by 
a motion for continuance, which was denied. (R. 091 /13-22) "A trial court's 
decision to either grant or deny a continuance is clearly within its discretion." The 
Appellate Court "will not disturb such decisions absent a clear abuse of 
discretion." State v. Tolano, 19 P.3d 400, 402, (Utah App. 2001) and State v. 
Arellano, 964 P. 2d 1167, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). However, regarding the 
issue as to prejudice to the Defendant, "the burden of establishing prejudice, is 
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shifted to the State" "Therefore to establish the prosecution's error was not 
prejudicial, the State must persuade the court that there is no reasonable likelihood 
that absent the prosecutor's error, the outcome would have been more favorable for 
the defendant". State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Utah App. 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Section 76-6-404. Theft 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Section 77-17-13. Expert testimony generally ~ Notice requirements. 
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in a 
felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing held pursuant to 
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the party intending to call the 
expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but not less 
than 30 days before trial or ten days before the hearing. 
(b) Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's 
curriculum vitae, and one of the following: 
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists; or 
(ii) a written explanation of the expert's proposed testimony sufficient to give 
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the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the testimony; and 
(iii) a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively consult with the 
opposing pai ty ()i i reasonable notice.. 
(c) The party intending to call the expert is responsible for any fee charged by 
the expert for the consultation. 
(2) If an expert's anticipated testimony will be based in whole or part on the 
results of any tests or other specialized data, the party intending to call the witness 
shall provide to the opposing party the informatioi iipoii request. 
(3) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report or the information 
concerning the expert's proposed testimony, the party receiving notice shall 
provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom the party anticipates calling to 
rebut the expert's testimony, including the information required under Subsection 
0)(b). 
(4) (a) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with the 
requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if necessary to prevent 
substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or hearing sufficient 
to allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
(M If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the result of 
bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate 
sanctions. The remedy of exclusion of the expert's testimony will only apply if the 
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court finds that a party deliberately violated the provisions of this section. 
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary 
hearing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
constitutes notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of the 
expert's proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by the expert 
at the preliminary hearing. 
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary hearing 
shall provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae as 
soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at which the expert may be called 
as an expert witness. 
(6) This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is an employee of 
the state or its political subdivisions, so long as the opposing party is on reasonable 
notice through general discovery that the expert may be called as a witness at trial, 
and the witness is made available to cooperatively consult with the opposing party 
upon reasonable notice. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged in a single count information filed February 3, 
2003, with the offense of Theft, a Third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-404. On February 3, 2003 the Defendant made an initial appearance 
and the information was read to him. On Febmary 11, 2003, the Defendant waived 
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his preliminary hearing, was arraigned on the charge and the matter was set for 
trial for March 2 0 - 2 1 , 2003. Due to a court scheduling conflict, the jury trial was 
held on Api il 24th and 25 th, 2003 with the Honorable Ji idge I >ai i lela G Heffernan 
presiding. During the course of the trial, the State called John Pearsoii, as an 
expert, to testify among other things as to the value and authenticity of the 
diamonds in question. Defense counsel moved to continue the trial pursuant to 
§77-17-13(4)(a) and the trial coiirt denied his motion. 
After a two-day jury trial, the jury returned with verdict, and oi i May 
27, 2003 the Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of zero to five 
years in the Utah State Prison. The Judgment, Sentencing and Commitment were 
filed on May 27, 2003. The prison term was commenced that day. 
The Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal on June 24, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Ihe Defendant was charged in a one-coiint information with the offense of 
theft, a third-degree felony in violation of UCA §76-6-404. (R. 001) A jury trial 
was held on April 24th and 25th 2003, with the Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan 
presiding. The trial commenced with the opening statement by the prosecution. 
Upon calling the first witness, a Mr. John Pearson, who was the co-owner of 
the jewelry store, the prosecution began to ask him aboiit his training and expertise 
in the recognition of diamonds. (R. 091/12) At tllat poiiit defense counsel 
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immediately objected on the basis that the State was attempting to qualify an 
expert witness in violation of UCA §77-17-13. (R. 091/13) 
The court then proceeded to hear arguments regarding the use of Mr. 
Pearson as an expert witness to testify regarding the whether or not the diamonds 
in question were actual diamonds, or were counterfeit. (R. 091/13-22) During this 
motion hearing the prosecutor acknowledged, "I have not sent [defense counsel] 
any notice that Mr. Pearson is an expert and, (sic) you know, diamonds or anything 
of that nature, and I'm not offering him to be the end-all and be-all in diamond 
experts." (R. 091/14) The prosecutor did intend to use Mr. Pearson to testify that 
the diamond in question was a real diamond, and that the diamond the Defendant 
brought into the store was a fake diamond. (R. 091/14) 
The trial court asked defense counsel if he was going to object to Mr. 
Pearson testifying about whether or not the diamond was fake, and Defense 
counsel stated, "that his opinion as a trained — somebody this has specialized 
training, yes, and going to object to- . (R. 091/19) The trial court then tried to get 
the prosecutor to carve out a limited scope of testimony from Mr. Pearson, but 
again Defense counsel objected stating, fTm gonna (sic) move for a mistrial then 
because we can try this and play games around it. They knew that he had expert 
training. They never told me. I knew he was the jewelry storeowner. I didn't 
know he had expert training. So I'm gonna (sic) move for mistrial or a 
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continuance.1' (R. 091/22) The trial court then denied the motion and allowed the 
testimony by Mr. Pearson. (R. 091/22) 
During Mr. Pearson's testimony he testified about various cuts and shapes of 
diamonds, as well as size, color, clarities of diamonds. (R. 091/31) He testified, 
regarding information concerning the diamonds that he had purchased for the store. 
(R. 091/34) He testified as to what cubic zirconium looked like. (R. 091/44, 81) 
Mr. Pearson further testified that in his opinion the stone that the Defendant tried to 
exchange with the store's diamond was fake. (R. 091/55,62) He testified how an 
expert can differentiate between man-made (cubic zirconium) and natural 
diamonds. (R. 091/56) 
He testified concerning several pictures of diamonds the State offered in 
evidence, and stated "the quality of the diamond, the clarity of the diamond, it's a 
good diamond." (R. 091/57) He testified that the diamond in question was a poorly 
cut stone, and that it was too narrow, which affects the bowtie effect (a 
characteristic of marquis cut diamonds). (R. 091/58) 
Mr. Pearson testified as to the value and price of the diamond at $1500. (R. 
091/59) He was the only person to testify as to the market value, or price of the 
diamond. Mr. Pearson continued testifying on how to distinguish between real and 
fake diamonds. Mr. Pearson even went so far as to instruct the jury on how to 
recognize a real diamond from a fake diamond. (R. 091/72) The witness testified 
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that he did not check the Defendant's diamond with a diamond-testing machine, 
"because I knew in my heart already that it wasn't real because I have enough 
experience that I know that that wasn't a real diamond.11 (R. 091 / 84, 85) 
In addition to the expert testimony related above, Mr. Pearson testified 
regarding the Defendant coming into the store and asking to look at some marquis 
cut diamonds. He took one of the diamonds and handed it to the Defendant in a 
small plastic packet. (R. 091/34) The Defendant began looking at it and started to 
back away from the counter. Mr. Pearson asked the Defendant to move back to the 
counter, and the Defendant continued to inch away from the counter, which made 
the witness concerned. (R. 091/36) The Defendant began shaking the pouch and 
eventually shook the loose stone into his hand. (R. 091/39) The Defendant then 
stuck his hand directly into his pocket and then shortly thereafter pulled out his 
hand and was holding a different stone. (R. 091 / 41) 
Mr. Pearson utilized a code to alert the other employee in the store as to 
theft. (R. 091/60) Mr. Pearson then went up to the Defendant stated, "Okay, games 
over. Give me my diamond Back." (R. 091/63) The Defendant then told Mr. 
Pearson that he "must have accidentally put it in his pocket." (R. 091 / 63) Mr. 
Pearson again testified as an expert that the diamond that the Defendant tried to 
give back to Mr. Pearson was "worth about ten bucks." (R. 091/63) Mr. Pearson 
testified that he believed that the Defendant had intentionally put the real diamond 
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into his pocket and attempted to exchange the real diamond with a cubic 
zirconium. 
Officer Jamie Garcia then testified that he had an opportunity to talk to the 
Defendant. The Defendant told him that his brother given him some fake 
diamonds to use for comparison when he was purchasing real diamonds. (R. 
091/111) The Defendant told Officer Garcia that he had a fake diamond and that he 
put the real diamond in his pocket by mistake. (R. 091/112) 
The defense called no witnesses, and after closing arguments of both counsel 
the jury found the Defendant guilty of the offense. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The determinative issue of the Defendant on appeal is whether the 
Defendant was improperly denied his motion for continuance pursuant to UCA 
§77-17-13(4)(a). The basis of that motion was that the prosecution called and 
began to qualify a Mr. Pearson as an expert in the recognition and valuation of 
diamonds. 
Once the prosecution began questioning Mr. Pearson on his expertise and 
training, defense counsel moved for either a mistrial or continuance pursuant to 
§77-17-13(4)(a). The prosecution claimed that Mr. Pearson was not an expert, but 
that any layperson would have the knowledge to both discern the authenticity of 
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the diamond, as well as estimate value. After a lengthy argument on this issue, the 
court denied the motion and allowed Mr. Pearson to testify. 
Mr. Pearson then testified that the Defendant came in the store, and while 
examining a marquis diamond removed it from its pouch, placed the diamond in 
his pocket, and replaced it with a cubic zirconium diamond. Mr. Pearson testified 
how he was able to determine that the store diamond was an authentic diamond, 
worth approximately $1500 and that the Defendant's diamond was cubic zirconium 
worth approximately " 10 bucks'1. 
Mr. Pearson's testimony constituted approximately one half of the entire 
testimony elicited at trial. The majority of this testimony consisted of instructing 
the jury on how to differentiate between an authentic diamond and a cubic 
zirconium diamond, or on the process he used in making this determination. 
At least two individuals testified that the Defendant admitted at one point or 
another that the diamond that he removed from his pocket was "fake", however, 
Mr. Pearson was also the only individual who testified as to the value of the 
diamonds in question. 
Based on the testimony of Mr. Pearson, the jury found the Defendant guilty 
of theft of the diamond. The jury also, utilizing almost exclusively the testimony 
of Mr. Pearson in determining that the value of the diamond was $1500, convicted 
the Defendant of a third-degree felony. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL BASED 
UPON A VIOLATION OF UCA §77-17-13. 
UCA §77-17-13 provides in relevant part: 
(1) (a) if the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in 
a felony case at trial or any hearing ... the party intending to call the 
expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as practicable but 
not less than 30 days before trial. 
The notice intended in this section includes information concerning the 
expert's name, address, curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report of one 
exists. The purpose for this section is to allow opposing counsel to be notified of 
the expert witness, and to give opposing counsel an opportunity to contact that 
witness and determine exactly what the witness intends to testify about, and an 
opportunity for opposing counsel to prepare for the examination, and possibly 
retain a witness in rebuttal. 
UCA §77-17-13(4)(a) provides the Defendant a remedy in the event of a 
violation of this requirement by the prosecution. That subsection provides: 
If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply with 
the requirements of this section, the opposing party shall, if necessary 
to prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the 
trial or hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. 
The Utah appellate courts have routinely held that compliance with UCA 
§77-17-13 is mandatory. In the case of State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah 
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App. 1997) the court established a four prong test to be used in reviewing a trial 
court's denial of a motion for continuance due to a §77-17-13 violation. That test 
is set forth as follows: 
In reviewing the denial of appellant's request for continuance or other 
relief, we consider four factors: (1) the extent of appellant's diligence 
in his efforts to ready his defense prior to the date set for trial; (2) the 
likelihood that the need for a continuance could have been met if the 
continuance had been granted; (3) the extent to which granting the 
continuance would have inconvenienced the court and the opposing 
party; and (4) the extent to which the appellant might have suffered 
harm as a result of the court's denial. (Citations omitted) 
In that case, the Court was presented with a factual situation in which the 
prosecution, during the first day of trial delivered some clothing to the State crime 
lab for analysis. On the afternoon of the first day of trial, the prosecution presented 
to the defense counsel with a report that the analysis resulted in a finding of human 
blood on the clothing. The Defendant then moved for the exclusion of the 
evidence, or for a continuance of the trial. The trial court denied both motions. 
During the in limine motion hearing, the prosecutor tried to argue that the proposed 
expert testimony was not prejudicial. The Court of Appeals ruled to the contrary, 
making the following observation of the trial court exchange in that hearing: 
The prosecutor stated: "[Wjhether or not there is blood on the panties 
is not a pivotal issue in this case, your honor." In response, the trial 
judge correctly observed, with our emphasis, as follows: 
Well, let me just tell you, as a prefatory matter / consider that 
testimony critical It's one thing to have lay people say it looks like 
blood. It's quite another thing to have the laboratory say it is in fact 
blood. For a couple of reasons. One, it's objective. And number two, 
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its impact upon jurors is substantially different than having the mother 
of the child say it looked like blood. (Id. at 531) 
Based upon an analysis under the four prong test, this Court reversed the 
Defendant's conviction and remanded the case for new trial. 
In the case of State v. Tolano, 19 P.3d 400 (Utah App. 2001) the Court was 
presented with a case wherein the prosecution called two criminologists to testify 
that the substance presented into evidence was in fact cocaine. The prosecution 
had failed to provide the requisite notice to defense, and the Defendant objected to 
the testimony, moved that the testimony be stricken, and requested a continuance. 
The trial court denied the continuance and the Utah Court of Appeals held: 
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
[defendant's] motion for continuance. First, [the defendant] exercised 
appropriate diligence in his efforts to ready his defense prior to the 
date set for trial... Second, it is likely that [the defendant] could have 
been more adequately prepare to meet the expert testimony at trial if 
the court had granted the continuance... Third, [the defendant's] right 
to the fair trial outweighed any inconvenience to the court, the 
opposing party, and the jury that may have been caused by a 
continuance... (Id. at 403) 
Furthermore, the Court noted that according to the case of State v. Arellano, 964 
P.2d 1167 (Utah App. 1998), The burden of establishing prejudice, is shifted to the 
State. The court, quoting the Arellano decision, held, " therefore to establish the 
prosecution's error was not prejudicial, the State must persuade the court that there 
is no reasonable likelihood that absent the prosecutor's error, the outcome would 
have been more favorable for the defendant". (Id at 404) 
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In the case of State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167 (Utah App. 1998), the Utah 
Court of Appeals reiterated the fourth prong criteria set forth above in reviewing 
expert witness testimony. In that case, the court was presented with a situation 
wherein the State utilized the testimony of the State Crime Lab chemist to testify 
regarding the identity of a controlled substance (cocaine). The State had utilized 
this expert during the preliminary hearing, and then five days prior to trial notified 
the Defendant that it intended to use that expert at trial. The trial court denied the 
Defendant's motion to exclude the testimony1, as well as the defense motion for 
continuance. The court concluded that there was uncontroverted testimony that the 
Defendant had not been given the proper 30-day notice of the proposed expert 
testimony, and therefore he was entitled to a continuance. The Utah Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion for continuance, 
and remanded the case for new trial. 
In State v. Tolano infra, the Court conducted a detailed analysis of the four 
prong test set forth above. That analysis may be useful in examining the present 
case, and is therefore reviewed here. Under the first prong, the Court found that 
First, Tolano exercised appropriate diligence in his efforts to ready his 
defense prior to the date set for trial. For example, Tolano interviewed 
1
 State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Utah App. 1998), "Here, the trial court 
did not find that the State acted in bad faith. Therefore, as to defendant's argument 
that McNair's (State Crime Lab chemist) expert testimony should have been 
excluded, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion to exclude McNair's testimony.5' 
14 
witnesses and made arrangements to have witnesses, including his 
stepson from Mexico, testify on his behalf. In addition, Tolano 
extensively cross-examined most of the State's witnesses,, Tolano 
made a chart outlining the area where the alleged offense occurred, 
and Tolano arranged for an interpreter when necessary. Finally, 
although Tolano was aware that the criminologists prepared the 
toxicology report, "it is not defendant's duty to anticipate and prepare 
for all potential, yet undisclosed expert witnesses. . . . " Consequently, 
"defense counsel appears to have been fully prepared to present 
defendant's case (Id at 403 citations omitted) 
Under the second prong, the court found: 
Second, it is likely that Tolano could have been more adequately 
prepared to meet the expert testimony if the trial court had granted the 
continuance. Specifically, a continuance would have provided Tolano 
with an opportunity to examine the testing procedures used by the 
experts and compare them with other testing methods, hire his own 
expert to challenge the testing procedures, and examine the resumes 
of the experts and possibly impugn their qualifications. Therefore, "[a] 
continuance would have both provided defendant more time to 
prepare to challenge [the experts'] testimony . . . and then incorporate 
any new information into the defense strategy." (Id at 403 citations 
omitted) 
The third test, determining whether the inconvenience to the court, opposing 
party and the jury is outweighed by the Defendants right to fair trial, the Court 
noted that "this court has specifically held that such an administrative concern is 
outweighed by the appellant's right to fair trial" (Id. at 404 citations omitted) 
The fourth factor, the harm the Defendant suffered as a result of the court's 
denial for a motion to continue, is to some extent presumed by this Court. In State 
v. Tolano infra the court held: 
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The final factor — the extent to which Tolano might have suffered 
harm as a result of the court's denial — is the "'most important among 
the factors.'" In Arellano, we recognized the difficult burden placed on 
defendants to establish prejudice in cases such as these, and we shifted 
the burden of proving prejudice from the defendant to the State. See 
id. "Therefore, to establish that the prosecution's error was not 
prejudicial, the State must persuade the court that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that, absent the prosecution's error, the outcome 
would have been more favorable for defendant." (Id. at 404 citations 
omitted) 
In the case at bar, there is no question that all four prongs of the requisite test 
had clearly been met. Under the first test, whether or not defense counsel had 
adequately prepared for trial, all indication from reading the transcript of the trial 
would indicate that is in fact the case. Defense counsel immediately objected to 
the proposed evidence, and even cited the relevant statute. Defense counsel did 
extensive cross-examination of various witnesses. There is no indication the 
defense counsel was unprepared for trial. It is important to note in the present case 
that the Defendant, for tactical reasons, waived the preliminary hearing. The fact 
that the State intended to utilize the owner of the store as an expert witness 
identifying both the stores5 diamond as authentic, and the Defendant's diamond as 
counterfeit would clearly be a surprise to the Defendant. Likewise, the expert 
testimony as to the value of both the store diamond and the substitute diamond was 
a surprise to the Defendant. Unlike the above-cited cases, where a preliminary 
hearing was held and the expert witness testified at the preliminary hearing, the 
case at bar presents this Court with a situation wherein defense counsel would have 
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been surprised by the testimony. Furthermore, "it is not defendant's duty to 
anticipate and prepare for all potential, yet undisclosed expert witnesses'^ State v. 
Tolano at 403) 
Considering the second prong, "it is likely that [the defendant] could been 
more adequately prepared to meet the expert testimony of the trial court had 
granted the continuance." Furthermore, a continuance would have allowed defense 
counsel "an opportunity to examine the testing procedures used by the experts and 
compare them with other testing methods, hire his own expert to challenge the 
testing procedures, and examine the resumes of the experts and possibly impugn 
their qualifications." (Id at 403 citations omitted) 
The third issue, with regards to inconvenience to the trial court, opposing 
counsel, or the jury, there is no question that the Defendants right to a fair trial 
clearly outweighs administrative concerns. Furthermore, since it is the State that 
failed to provide notice as required under §77-17-13, it would be disingenuous for 
the state to thereafter argue that it has been inconvenience by the Defendant's 
timely objection. 
The final prong, harm to the Defendant, has clearly been established. Just as 
in all of the cases cited above, the expert testimony regarding the diamond is 
crucial to the prosecution's case. If the prosecutor was unable to establish that the 
store's diamond was authentic, and the Defendant's substitute diamond was 
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counterfeit, they would be unable to establish the value element of the offense. If 
the Defendant was intending to substitute a real diamond for a real diamond of 
comparable value, the theft amount would be nominal, and consequently the 
Defendant would be convicted of a Class B misdemeanor. Defendant is cognizant 
of the fact that Officer Garcia stated that the Defendant admitted the substitute 
diamond was fake. However, there was absolutely no testimony or statement by 
the defendant as to the value of the substitute diamond. Conversely, if the 
prosecution were unable to establish that the stores diamond was an authentic 
diamond, the same value issue would relegate the conviction to a misdemeanor 
level. Finally, the ultimate value of the diamond is an element of the offense. 
Without the expert testimony of Mr. Pearson regarding the value of the diamond, 
the Defendant could only be convicted of a misdemeanor. 
The prosecutor's argument during the motion in limine that they only needed 
lay testimony from Mr. Pearson belies the fact that the State needed some expert to 
testify regarding the authenticity of the diamond in question. In State v. Begishe 
infra, the trial court recognized this fact in stating, 
Well, let me just tell you, as a prefatory matter / consider that 
testimony critical It's one thing to have lay people say it looks like 
blood. It's quite another thing to have the laboratory say it is in fact 
blood. For a couple of reasons. One, it's objective. And number two, 
its impact upon jurors is substantially different than having the mother 
of the child say it looked like blood. (Id. at 531) 
18 
Likewise, in the present case, testimony regarding the authenticity, or lack thereof 
of the diamonds in question, is absolutely crucial to the prosecution's case. The 
fact that the prosecution elicited the testimony numerous times is simply one more 
indication of its critical value. Clearly the expertise of Mr. Pearson was referred to 
again and again during trial . 
The State may raise a collateral issue concerning the value of the property 
stolen. Clearly the State carries the burden of proving that the property stolen 
exceeded $1000. The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of State v. Logan 563 P.2d 
811, 813 (Utah 1977) held that the test used for determining value was the market 
value, and defined market value as Mthe price a well-informed buyer would pay to a 
well-informed seller where neither is obligated to enter into the transaction.ff 
In the case of State v. Carter 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985), the court recognized 
the necessity of having an expert testify regarding valuation. In that case the State 
failed to put on a competent expert regarding valuation with regards to value at the 
place where the offense occurred. The Court reversed the Defendant's conviction 
based upon that failure and noted, "in this case, the only relevant testimony 
concerning the value of the camera equipment in Salt Lake City was from the 
defendant's expert." (Id. at 662) The court further stated," 
2
 Some of these references are included in R. 091 / pages 12, 31, 34, 41, 44, 55, 56, 
57, 58,59,62,72, 81, 84, and 85 
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The value of the used camera equipment was not a fact within the 
common knowledge of the jury. Since the only evidence of the value 
of the camera equipment at the place it was stolen was the testimony 
of [the defendant's expert] the only value supported by the evidence 
was the figure he gave, $177.00." (Id. at 662) 
In the case of State v. Lyman, 996 P.2d 278 (Utah App. 1998) the court 
reiterated the fair market value definition to be used in theft cases, and stated, 
"under this definition, purchase price alone is generally not sufficient to prove the 
value goods on the date they were stolen." (Id. at 813) 
The fourth, and final prong of the §77-17-13 test is the burden of 
establishing the lack of harm to the Defendant. As mentioned above, this has been 
placed on the prosecution, and it is the Defendant's position that the prosecution 
cannot meet that burden. There is no question that if the jury had not heard the 
evidence regarding value from Mr. Pearson, the jury would have been unable to 
make a determination that the value of the diamond exchange exceeded $1000. 
There can be no question that the value or authenticity of diamonds is "not a fact 
within the common knowledge of the jury." ( State v. Carter infra at 662) since the 
jury was relegated to rely upon Mr. Pearson for the valuation element of the 
offense, the Defendant was clearly prejudiced by the §77-17-13 violation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests this court 
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reverse the Defendant's conviction and remand for^new trial. 
DATED this? day of January, 2004. / 
LNDALL W. RICHARDS 
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ROUND. AND THERE WERE THREE EARRING POSTS. AND THEN THESE 
TWO PARTICULAR RINGS ARE FOUND AND THEY HAVE THE SAME KIND OF 
STONE TYPE ARRANGEMENTS AS THESE OTHER ITEMS THAT WERE FOUND. 
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL, WHETHER OR NOT IT BE 
TODAY OR TOMORROW THAT WE CONCLUDE THIS TRIAL, AFTER YOU HEAR 
ALL OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE, WE'LL COME BACK AT THAT TIME 
AND THE STATE WILL ASK YOU TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF RETAIL 
THEFT. IT'S A FELONY OFFENSE BECAUSE THE RING ~ THE --
EXCUSE ME, THE DIAMOND ITSELF IS A $1,500 DIAMOND, AND THAT 
MAKES IT A FELONY OFFENSE. AT THAT TIME, I'LL ASK THAT YOU 
CONVICT THE DEFENDANT BASED ON HIM ACTUALLY TAKING THIS 
DIAMOND. THANK YOU. 
' . i'T: MR. GRAVIS. 
GRAVIS: DEFENSE RESERVES OPENING STATEMENT. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. ALL RIGHT. ARE YOU READY TO 
CALL YOUR FIRST WITNESS? 
MS. BEATON: MR. PEARSON MAY BE OUTSIDE. I HAVEN'T 
CHECKED. 
THE COURT: OKAY. GO AHEAD AND CHECK IF YOU WOULD. 
MS. BEATON: HE IS, I CAN SEE HIM. 
JOHN PEARSON, 
BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED 
AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY Mi.! BEATON: 
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1 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND OCCUPATION. 
2 A. JOHN PEARSON. I'M CO-OWNER OF CASSAR JEWELERS. 
3 Q. MR. PEARSON, HOW LONG HAVE YOU WORKED AT CASSAR 
4 JEWELERS? 
5 A. I'VE BEEN THERE ABOUT THREE YEARS. 
6 Q. OKAY. AND THE ENTIRE TIME THAT YOU'VE BEEN THERE, HAVE 
7 YOU ALWAYS BEEN THE CO-OWNER OR DID YOU — WERE YOU JUST AN 
8 EMPLOYEE AT ONE POINT? 
9 A. I WAS — ALWAYS BEEN A CO-OWNER. 
10 Q. OKAY. AS A RESULT OF WORKING AT CASSAR JEWELERS, HAVE 
11 YOU HAD ANY PARTICULAR TRAINING IN THE RECOGNITION OF 
12 DIAMONDS SPECIFICALLY? 
13 A. WE HAVE. 
14 Q. WHAT TYPE OF TRAI --
15 MR. GRAVIS: YOUR HONOR, MAY I APPROACH THE BENCH? 
16 THE COURT: YES. 
17 (A CONFERENCE WAS HELD AT THE BENCH.) 
18 THE COURT: I'M GONNA ~ I DID TELL YOU THAT -- I DIDN'T 
19 EXPECT IT QUITE THIS SOON — BUT THERE'D BE MOMENTS WHEN I 
20 MAY HAVE TO ASK YOU TO LEAVE THE COURTROOM AND — WHILE WE 
21 DISCUSS A MATTER OF LAW THAT NEEDS TO BE CONSIDERED OUTSIDE 
22 OF YOUR HEARING. SO I'M GONNA ASK THE BAILIFF IF HE WOULD 
23 PLEASE ESCORT THE JURY TO THE JURY ROOM. WE'LL GET RIGHT 
24 BACK TO YOUR ROLE IN JUST A MINUTE. 
25 (THE JURY LEAVES COURTROOM.) 
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THE COURT: LET ME GET THE RULE OUT SO WE'VE GOT THAT IN 
FRONT OF US. 
Ml', CRAVI:'. 77-17-13. 
THE COURT: I KNOW THERE'S JUST SOME RECENT LEGISLATION 
THAT EITHER ATTEMPTED TO CHANGE THAT RULE OR DID CHANGE IT. 
I'M NOT SURE IF THEY ACTUALLY CHANGED IT OR NOT, BUT --
MR. GRAVIS: THEY CHANGED THE RULE (UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
TDK GuUKT: IT'S NOT IN EFFECT YET — 
MR. GRAVIS: — WITNESSES WHO ARE EMPLOYED BY THE STATE, 
BUT IT — IT STILL REQUIRES NOTIFICATION — 
THE COURT: I'M -- I'M FAMILIAR WITH THE RULE, BUT I'M 
GONNA REREAD IT JUST SO I'VE GOT EVERYTHING IN MIND. 
OKAY. WHY DON'T YOU STATE, MR. GRAVIS, WHAT YOUR — 
WHAT YOUR OBJECTION IS AND THEN — 
MM GRAVIS MY OBJECTION IS THAT I'VE RECEIVED NO 
NOTIFICATION OF THE STATE'S INTENT TO CALL AN EXPERT WITNESS. 
HE CAN TESTIFY AS THE OWNER OF CAESAR'S JEWELERS THIS APPEARS 
TO BE THE DIAMOND AND THIS APPEARS TO BE THE FAKE DIAMOND, 
BUT IF SHE'S GOING TO HAVE HIM GIVE OPINION BASED UPON 
TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE, SPECIALIZED TRAINING WHICH SHE'S 
GOING INTO, SHE'S QUALIFIED HIM AS AN EXPERT. I'VE RECEIVED 
NO NOTICE AND NO CURRICULUM VITAE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. DO YOU WANNA RESPOND TO THAT? 
MS. BEATON: I DO. MR. PEARSON WORKS IN A BUSINESS 
WHERE HE HAS TO DEAL WITH A PARTICULAR TYPE OF ITEM ON A 
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REGULAR BASIS. THE FACT THAT HE CAN ACTUALLY RECOGNIZE WHAT 
THAT ITEM IS FROM THE FAKE, I DON'T THINK IS A SITUATION 
WHERE I'M CALLING HIM -- CALLING FOR HIM TO MAKE AN EXPERT 
OPINION AS TO THE SITUATION. IT'S LIKE IF SOMEBODY WORKED IN 
A CLOTHING STORE, AND THEY COULD LOOK AT A PAIR OF PANTS AND 
SAY, THOSE ARE DOCKERS VERSUS THOSE ARE, YOU KNOW, LEVI 
STRAUSS, I THINK THAT'S SOMETHING THAT ONCE YOU ARE IN A 
BUSINESS LIKE THAT, YOU CAN AUTOMATICALLY MAKE THAT 
ASSESSMENT OF IT. I'M NOT GOING TO SAY TO HIM, YOU KNOW, IS 
THE QUALITY OF THIS A CERTAIN — OR IS THIS, YOU KNOW, IS 
THIS, YOU KNOW --I'M NOT GONNA ASK HIM ANY DETAILS ABOUT 
DIAMONDS, YOU KNOW, HOW THEY'RE FORMED, HOW THEY'RE, YOU 
KNOW, ANYTHING ABOUT THAT OTHER THAN THE FACT THAT HE HAD A 
DIAMOND THAT HE HAD SEEN ON A REGULAR BASIS IN HIS STORE, AND 
THAT THAT DIAMOND WAS REPLACED WITH AN OBVIOUS FAKE. DEFENSE 
COUNSEL HAS HAD NOTICE THAT THIS WAS A JEWELRY TYPE SITUATION 
AND THAT MR. PEARSON WAS INVOLVED IN THIS CASE SINCE JANUARY 
31ST WHEN THIS CASE WAS FILED AND THE DEFENDANT WAS PLACED IN 
CUSTODY. MR. GRAVIS IS RIGHT, I HAVE NOT SENT HIM ANY NOTICE 
THAT MR. PEARSON IS AN EXPERT IN, YOU KNOW, DIAMONDS OR 
ANYTHING OF THAT NATURE, AND I'M NOT OFFERING HIM TO BE THE 
END-ALL AND BE-ALL IN DIAMOND EXPERTS. BUT WHAT I DO WANT 
HIM TO SAY IS, I RECOGNIZE MY DIAMOND AND I RECOGNIZE A FAKE, 
AND THIS IS HOW I RECOGNIZE IT BECAUSE I HAVE -- I HAVE HAD A 
COUPLE CLASSES. THE OFFICER'S HAD A COUPLE CLASSES AS WELL, 
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AND THAT ISN'T QUALIFYING HIM AS AN EXPERT ON THE APPLICATION 
OF MIRANDA OR ANYTHING OF THAT NATURE, BUT EVERYBODY HAS TO 
TALK ABOUT AND GIVE A FOUNDATION AS TO WHY THEY THINK A 
CERTAIN WAY. AND I THINK I'M ENTITLED TO EXPLAIN TO THE JURY 
WHY MR. PEARSON THINKS THAT HE WAS DEALING WITH A REAL 
DIAMOND, AND THEN WHY HE KNEW HE WAS DEALING WITH A FAKE 
DIAMOND. 
I ALSO DON'T THINK THAT MR. GRAVIS HAS ESTABLISHED ANY 
REASON TO -- THE REMEDY BY LAW IS A GRANT OF CONTINUANCE. I 
DON'T THINK THAT THERE'S ANYTHING THAT'S GONNA BE SHOCKING OR 
SURPRISING BY WHAT MR. PEARSON'S GONNA SAY IN TERMS OF HIS 
EXPERIENCE OR WHY HE THINKS THAT. AND CERTAINLY HE CAN ARGUE 
TO THE JURY HE DOESN'T THINK MR. PEARSON HAS ENOUGH 
EXPERIENCE OR HE HASN'T BEEN WORKING IN THE BUSINESS LONG 
ENOUGH OR THAT, YOU KNOW, THE FAKE WASN'T REALLY A FAKE, EVEN 
THOUGH THEY HAVE A MACHINE AND THAT KIND OF THING TO 
DETERMINE WHICH IT IS. MR. GRAVIS HASN'T ESTABLISHED A 
REASON FOR A CONTINUANCE. YOU KNOW, IF THE COURT THINKS THAT 
THAT'S APPROPRIATE, THEN — THEN THAT'S WHAT WE'LL DO, BUT I 
DON'T KNOW WHAT TYPE OF PREPARATION MR. GRAVIS WOULD HAVE 
DONE IN ADDITION TO, YOU KNOW, TO ASSIST HIM WITH 
CROSS-EXAMINING MR. PEARSON BECAUSE THIS ISN'T — YOU KNOW, 
THIS ISN'T EVEN AN EXAMPLE OF, SAY, A LAB ANALYST. THIS 
ISN'T SOMEBODY WHO'S GOT ALL THIS SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE — 
THE COURT: OKAY. SO YOU'RE SAYING THE LIMITS OF WHAT 
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YOU'RE ASKING MR. PEARSON ARE — IS WHAT HIS FAMILIARITY WITH 
THE DIAMOND THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS LOOKING AT. 
MS. BEATON: RIGHT. 
THE COURT: WHICH SIMPLY HIS EXPERIENCE WITH IT — 
MR. GRAVIS: I AGREE, BUT — 
THE COURT: I'M — I'M — LET ME JUST FINISH, OKAY? I 
DON'T KNOW WHAT YOUR PROBLEM IS WITH THIS, BUT I'M JUST 
TRYING TO MAKE SURE I UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU'RE LIMITING IT TO. 
AND THAT AT SOME POINT IN TIME, HE OBSERVED THAT THERE WAS A 
DIFFERENCE IN THE DIAMOND THAT WAS NOW ON THE COUNTER, OR 
WHEREVER IT WAS, WITH WHAT HE HAD GIVEN THE DEFENDANT TO LOOK 
AT, AND THAT HIS OBSERVATIONS, THE DIFFERENCE WAS THAT ONE 
WAS REAL AND ONE WAS NOT. 
MS. BEATON: CORRECT. 
THE COURT: AND I SUPPOSE -- I SUPPOSE THE REAL CRITICAL 
QUESTION IS, FIRST OF ALL, I DON'T KNOW THAT A LAY PERSON 
WOULD BE ABLE TO JUST WALK IN AND SAY I KNOW THE DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN A REAL ONE AND A FAKE ONE. WHAT IS IT ABOUT 
MR. PEARSON'S BACKGROUND THAT — THAT ALLOWS HIM TO BE ABLE 
TO MAKE THAT JUDGMENT? IS IT BASED ON — WHAT IS IT BASED 
ON? MAYBE YOU COULD — 
MS. BEATON: I THINK IT'S BASED ON HIS TRAINING AND 
OBVIOUSLY THE FACT THAT HE OWNS THIS PARTICULAR BUSINESS. 
AND HE HAS HAD A CERTAIN NUMBER OF, YOU KNOW, CLASSES TO 
PREPARE HIM OR INSTRUCTION TO PREPARE HIM, AND HE ALSO HAS 
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DEALT WITH THESE DIAMONDS ON A REGULAR DAY IN AND DAY OUT 
BASIS AND CAN TELL, YOU KNOW, BY THE LOOK OF THEM AND BY THE 
SHAPE OF THEM AND THAT SORT OF THING WHAT IT IS THAT HE'S 
DEALING WITH. HE ALSO HAS A MACHINE TO VERIFY WHAT HIS 
CONCLUSION IS, AND I THINK IT JUST MAKES SENSE TO EXPLAIN TO 
THE JURY WHAT THE FOUNDATION IS FOR WHY MR. PEARSON HAS THE 
BELIEF THAT HE DOES THAT, ONE, HE BEGAN WITH A REAL DIAMOND, 
AND THAT, TWO, WHAT HE WAS THEN DEALING WITH WAS A FAKE 
DIAMOND. 
,:
 1 COURT: AND THESE ARE JUST BASED ON HIS 
OBSERVATIONS; HE DIDN'T GO DO ANY TESTING OR ANYTHING OF THAT 
SORT? 
MS. BEATON: THERE'S A MACHINE THAT'S IN THE STORE THAT 
HE COULD — HE ACTUALLY VERIFIED THE REAL DIAMOND WAS A REAL 
DIAMOND, THAT HE ACTUALLY APPLIED TO THAT, THIS DIAMOND THAT 
WE'RE TALKING ABOUT TO THAT. 
TRK COURT: AND DID HE TEST THE FAKE DIAMOND? 
MS. BEATON: HE DID NOT TEST THE FAKE DIAMOND. 
THE COURT: SO YOU'RE NOT GONNA GET INTO TESTIMONY OR 
TESTING OF THE OTHER DIAMOND. IT'S JUST SIMPLY HIS 
OBSERVATIONS ~ 
MS. BEATON: CORRECT. 
THE COURT: -- AND OPINION BASED ON HIS OBSERVATION. 
MS. BEATON: RIGHT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. I'LL LET YOU FOLLOW UP ON THAT IF YOU 
18 
WANT, BUT — 
MR. GRAVIS: WELL, HE COULD TESTIFY ABOUT HIS 
OBSERVATION, BUT WHEN SHE'S TRYING TO GET IN TRAINING, 
SPECIALIZED TRAINING, THEN SHE'S MAKING HIM AN EXPERT. 
THE COURT: ARE YOU GONNA OBJECT WHEN -- IF SHE GIVES AN 
OPINION AS TO WHETHER IT WAS FAKE OR REAL BASED ON LACK OF 
FOUNDATION? 
MR. GRAVIS: HE DIDN'T TEST IT. I CAN CERTAINLY ARGUE 
THAT. 
THE COURT: BUT I MEAN IN TERMS OF IF -- IF SHE DOESN'T 
GO INTO YOU HAVE THIS KIND OF TRAINING — 
MR. GRAVIS: HE — HE CAN GIVE HIS OPINION AS AN OWNER 
OF A JEWELRY STORE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. SO WE'RE NOT — I GUESS WHAT I — I 
THINK WHAT -- I THINK WHAT MS. BEATON WAS JUST TRYING TO — 
THIS IS MY GUESS, OKAY? SHE'S TRYING TO GET IT IN, THE 
FOUNDATION AND FORM ON THE BASIS OF WHICH HE COULD MAKE THAT 
OBSERVATION — 
MR. GRAVIS: WELL, HE'S WORKED — 
THE COURT: -- AND HAVE SOME VALIDITY --
MR. GRAVIS: HE'S WORKED IN A JEWELRY STORE FOR THREE 
YEARS. HE OWNS THE JEWELRY STORE. THAT'S --
THE COURT: OKAY. YOU'RE NOT GONNA OBJECT TO HIM MAKING 
AN OBSERVATION THAT THIS WAS A FAKE DIAMOND — 
MR. GRAVIS: IN HIS OPINION AS A JEWELERY STORE OWNER, 
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NO, I'M NOT GONNA OBJECT TO THAT — 
THE COURT: OKAY. THEN — 
MR. GRAV — BUT HIS OPINION AS A TRAINED — SOMEBODY 
THAT'S HAD SPECIALIZED TRAINING, YES, I'M GONNA OBJECT TO --
THE COURT: OKAY. I — THIS IS WHAT I'M GONNA DO: TO 
THE EXTENT THAT FOUNDATION WOULD BOLSTER HIS TESTIMONY AS AN 
EXPERT, THAT SOMEHOW HE STANDS IN A DIFFERENT SITUATION OTHER 
THAN AS AN OWNER OF THE STORE, THAT SOMEHOW HE'S HAD ALL THIS 
TRAINING AND WOULD DEFINITELY KNOW THAT THIS WAS A FAKE 
VERSUS A REAL ONE, I'M GONNA ASK YOU JUST NOT TO LAY THAT 
FOUNDATION BECAUSE THAT DOES PERHAPS ELEVATE THIS TO THE — 
TO THE ARENA OF A — OF AN EXPERT OR SOMEONE THAT WOULD BE 
TOTALLY DIFFERENT. HE IS OWNER OF THE — HE'S THE OWNER OF 
THE ORIGINAL OBJECT. OWNERS CAN GIVE TESTIMONY AS TO VALUE, 
THAT TYPE OF THING. HE HAS SOME EXPERIENCE IN RECOGNIZING 
CERTAINLY WHAT WAS — THE DIAMOND THAT HE GAVE VERSUS A 
DIAMOND THAT MAY HAVE BEEN SUBSTITUTED. AND IF HE BASED ON 
HIS OBSERVATIONS WAS ABLE TO TELL ONE WAS REAL AND ONE 
WASN'T, THEN I THINK THAT'LL COME IN. BUT IF THERE'S NOT 
GONNA BE AN OBJECTION FOR, YOU KNOW, LACK OF FOUNDATION BASED 
UPON HIS OBSERVATIONS, THEN IF YOU CAN DISPENSE WITH THAT, I 
THINK WE'VE SOLVED THE PROBLEM. 
MS. BEATON: OKAY. I ~ 
241 THE COURT: OKAY. 
25 MS. BEATON: I ASSUME THAT COUNSEL GETS UP ON THE STAND, 
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THOUGH, AND MAKES SOME CLAIM THAT MR. PEARSON DOESN'T KNOW 
WHAT HE'S TALKING ABOUT, I COULD AT LEAST USE IT IN REBUTTAL 
TO SAY, WELL, YOU HAVE HAD TRAINING AND, YOU KNOW, THIS ISN'T 
JUST SOME OFF-THE-CUFF I-ONLY-WORK-IN-THE-STORE-ONCE-IN-A-
WHILE KIND OF COMMENT. 
MR. GRAVIS: HE WORKS IN THE STORE, THAT'S — 
THE COURT: WELL, I THINK IF — IF HE'S CHALLENGED ON 
HOW HE KNOWS IT, I THINK THEN YOU OPEN UP THE DOOR TO HOW HE 
DOES KNOW IT. 
MR. GRAVIS: WELL, YOUR HONOR — 
THE COURT: I'M JUST TELLING YOU IN 
ADVANCE (UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
MR. GRAVIS: I'M JUST TELLING YOU IN ADVANCE IF THAT 
HAPPENS, THEN WE'RE GONNA ASK FOR A CONTINUANCE BECAUSE --
BECAUSE I'M ENTITLED TO WHAT THE LAW SPECIFICALLY SAYS SO. 
IF THAT'S WHERE WE'RE GONNA BE, THEN WE MIGHT AS WELL 
CONTINUE IT NOW. 
THE COURT: WELL, LET ME JUST ALSO DISTINGUISH THIS 
SITUATION FROM ANOTHER. IF HE HAD TAKEN BOTH OF THEM BACK 
AND DID SOME INDEPENDENT TESTING THAT REQUIRES EXPERTISE, AND 
CAME UP WITH AN OPINION BASED ON THAT, IF HE'S ABLE TO LOOK 
AT IT AND SAY, THERE'S NO WAY --
MR. GRAVIS: I DON'T EVEN HAVE ANY — ANY PROBLEM IF 
THIS IS -- THIS MACHINE IS A STANDARD IN EVERY JEWELRY STORE, 
THAT HE SAYS HE TESTED THE REAL DIAMOND, BUT HE DIDN'T TEST 
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THE ALLEGED FAKE DIAMOND. 
THE COURT: WELL, I THINK IF YOU CHALLENGE HIS 
CREDIBILITY OF HIS OBSERVATIONS AND YOU GET INTO HIS 
BACKGROUND, THEN I THINK YOU OPEN UP THE DOOR SO — 
MR. GRAVIS: WELL, I'M JUST SAYING, I DON'T HAVE ANY 
OBJECTION IF THEY GET INTO THAT HE TESTED THE REAL DIAMOND ON 
THE MACHINE, IF IT'S A MACHINE STANDARD IN ALL JEWELRY 
STORES. 
THE COURT: NO, I'M SAYING — SEE, I DON'T -- MY PROBLEM 
IS I DON'T KNOW HOW YOU'RE GONNA CROSS-EXAMINE HIM, AND WHAT 
YOU'RE GONNA GET INTO — 
MR. GRAVIS: WELL, YOUR HONOR, NOW YOU'RE --
THE COURT: IF YOU GET -- LET ME JUST FINISH. IF YOU 
GET INTO QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS BACKGROUND AND HIS TRAINING AND 
ALL THAT, THEN I THINK SHE'S ENTITLED TO ON A FOLLOW-UP — 
MR. GRAVIS: WELL, YOUR HONOR, PUTTING ME BETWEEN A ROCK 
AND A HARD PLACE. I DON'T KNOW WHAT I'M GONNA ASK HIM, BUT 
IF -- IF WE'RE GOING -- IF THE COURT -- WELL, I'M GONNA LET 
THE COURT KNOW WELL IN ADVANCE IF THE COURT ALLOWS STATE TO 
GET INTO THAT, THEN WE HAVE A RIGHT TO CONTINUANCE TO — 
THE COURT: I GUESS TO THE EXTENT THAT — THAT AT THAT 
POINT HE'S BEEN CHARACTERIZED AS AN EXPERT. IF YOU'RE THE 
ONE THAT STARTS TO CHARACTERIZE HIM AS AN EXPERT, HOWEVER, 
THEN I THINK SHE'S ENTITLED TO FOLLOW UP ON IT. SHE'S NOT — 
MR. GRAVIS: WELL, YOUR HONOR — 
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THE COURT: I'M — THE WAY I'M LIMITING IT IS THAT — 
MR. GRAVIS: — I'M GONNA MOVE FOR MISTRIAL THEN BECAUSE 
WE CAN'T TRY THIS AND PLAY GAMES AROUND IT. THEY KNEW THAT 
HE HAD EXPERT TRAINING. THEY NEVER TOLD ME. I KNEW HE WAS A 
JEWELRY STORE OWNER. I DIDN'T KNOW HE HAD EXPERT TRAINING. 
SO I'M GONNA MOVE FOR MISTRIAL OR A CONTINUANCE. 
THE COURT: DENIED. LET'S GO AHEAD WITH THE CASE. AND 
GIVEN -- GIVEN THE LIMITATIONS THAT I'VE JUST PLACED ON, YOU 
KNOW, ON ESTABLISH — BOLSTERING BASICALLY HIS 
QUALIFICATIONS, HE'S BASICALLY TESTIFYING AS THE OWNER OF THE 
STORE AND HIS OBSERVATIONS. 
MS. BEATON: OKAY. 
THE COURT: AND HIS EXPERIENCE WITH THE OTHER DIAMOND, I 
THINK IS PROBABLY -- IF WE CAN LIMIT IT TO THAT, I THINK 
THAT -- THAT KEEPS IT WITHIN THE REALM OF OWNER OF AN OBJECT, 
OBSERVATIONS THAT HE — THAT HE'S ENTITLED TO MAKE ABOUT HIS 
OWN PROPERTY, THAT TYPE OF THING. 
MS. BEATON: OKAY. 
THE COURT: SO YOU CAN BRING JURY BACK IN. 
(THE JURY RETURNS TO THE COURTROOM.) 
THE COURT: THANK YOU FOR YOUR PATIENCE. WE'RE READY TO 
GET STARTED AGAIN. GO AHEAD. 
Q. (BY MS. BEATON) OKAY. MR. PEARSON, WE WERE TALKING 
ABOUT THE FACT THAT YOU HAD — YOU WORK AT CASSAR JEWELERS 
AND YOU'RE THE — ONE OF THE CO-OWNERS OF THE BUSINESS. HOW 
